Lena Noir

D2C knitwear / Brand launch + acquisition economics

TEPLO

The first drop sold. The economics were bad.

Contribution margin over a beautiful sales number

September 2024–June 2025 · Project-owner operating record

92% / 11 daysFirst-drop sell-through
$19.40 → $11.80Reported CAC · Drop 1 to Drop 3
~24%Repeat purchase within 90 days

01 / The assignment

Project facts

Engagement
September 2024–June 2025
Launch budget
~$5,800
Workload
12–14 hours / week at launch; later 8–10
Channels
Instagram, Telegram, micro-influencers, marketplace test

Starting point & challenge

Six weeks before the first drop, the brand had no existing audience. The positioning was factory-made knitwear with manufacturing shown as it actually happened.

The launch was built in public through raw materials, production, fittings, mistakes, packaging and product decisions rather than a polished finished-brand fiction.

02 / Responsibility

Owned, delegated, client-side

Project work

Launch content, waitlist, influencer collaborations and channel experiments. No named production-team breakdown was supplied.

Founder / business

Product pricing, manufacturing and order economics formed part of the operating decisions described here.

03 / Work log

How the work unfolded

  1. Six weeks before Drop 1

    Show the manufacturing decisions

    The content documented real production stages and imperfections. By launch, the waitlist was approximately 1,900 people.

  2. Drop 1 · first 11 days

    Sell-through was only half the story

    An 8.4% waitlist conversion implied approximately 160 orders. Sell-through reached 92% in 11 days. At $58 average order value, reported revenue was approximately $9,280.

    The $29 cardigan had approximately $14 product cost, $6 logistics and $5.50 packaging plus payment processing: only $3.50 contribution before acquisition, against a reported $19.40 Drop 1 CAC.

  3. Pricing correction

    Accept the audience loss

    The cardigan relaunched at $39. Communication emphasized cost per wear and longevity rather than affordable knitwear. Approximately 600 people unfollowed; the price change was not reversed.

    Contribution before acquisition rose to around $13.50 or more per order. This improved the path to payback through repeat purchasing, but did not establish cohort-level profitability.

  4. Drop 3 / by month six

    Track improving acquisition alongside retention

    Reported CAC fell to $11.80 by Drop 3. Total orders reached approximately 2,100 by month six, and repeat purchase within 90 days later reached about 24%.

    Twenty-three barter collaborations with creators of roughly 5K–30K followers generated 214 promo-code-attributed orders. They are tracked orders, not a separate incremental-sales experiment.

  5. Two-month marketplace test

    Distribution revenue was not enough

    Ozon generated approximately $4,100 in two months. Commissions, margin and observed overlap with owned-channel demand made the result less attractive than the revenue headline.

    The marketplace was reduced to clearance and remaining inventory. The supplied cannibalization estimate is not published as a numeric result without its estimation method.

04 / Operating infrastructure

What made the work repeatable

Build-in-public content

Materials, production, fittings, mistakes, packaging and product decisions.

Unit-economics review

Price less product cost, logistics, packaging and payment costs before acquisition.

Creator tracking

Promo codes across 23 barter collaborations.

Attribution and repeat purchase

Promotional codes and post-purchase surveys, with missing-source orders excluded from channel claims.

05 / The difficult part

Failures, constraints & corrections

The cardigan was underpriced

At $29, the approximate $3.50 pre-acquisition contribution could not support the reported $19.40 acquisition cost. The response was a pricing correction, not simply cheaper traffic.

A necessary price increase lost followers

About 600 unfollows followed the $39 relaunch. The business retained the new price to protect contribution.

Marketplace revenue obscured channel economics

The Ozon test produced revenue but raised margin and owned-demand overlap concerns. Its role was narrowed to clearance inventory.

06 / Reported outcomes

Before & after

Instagram audience

Before / baseline

0

After / reported result

~11,200

Telegram audience

Before / baseline

0

After / reported result

~3,400

Reported CAC

Before / baseline

$19.40 · Drop 1

After / reported result

$11.80 · Drop 3

Cardigan price

Before / baseline

$29

After / reported result

$39

Cardigan contribution before acquisition

Before / baseline

~$3.50

After / reported result

~$13.50+

Total orders

Before / baseline

No existing audience at launch

After / reported result

~2,100 by month six

Repeat purchase within 90 days

Before / baseline

Not supplied

After / reported result

~24%

“We nearly destroyed the margin chasing a beautiful sales number. The best decision we made was raising the price and accepting the follower loss.”

Founder · quote supplied in the project record

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